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Abstract
This report describes the current state of the research performed as a
part of the CyberShip project for its Work Package 2. This work package
aims at defining a CyberShip model and KPIs for cyber resilience. This is a
project funded by the Danish Maritime Fund (DMF) with the objective of
proposing a framework for improving the resilience of the shipping indus-
try.
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1 Introduction
The CyberShip project, "Cyber resilience for the shipping industry", is aimed
at proposing a theoretical framework to aid the decision making process for
preventing and reacting to cyber-attacks in the shipping industry. This project
is divided into six work packages that are developed sequentially. These work
packages are:
• Work Package 1 (WP1): Project Management, to coordinate technical ac-
tivities and assure quality of results
• Work Package 2 (WP2): Definition of Cyber Resilience KPIs, to define a
specific cyber-ship model and cyber resilience key performance indica-
tors (KPIs)
• Work Package 3 (WP3): Cyber-attack prevention measures, to define mea-
sures and tools at a strategic (design) level
• Work Package 4 (WP4): Cyber-attack response and recovery measures, to
define measures and tools once and if the cyber-attack occurs
• Work Package 5 (WP5): Evaluation and application to specific case stud-
ies, to define and evaluate the case studies, and to propose recommenda-
tions for the shipping industry and regulators
• Work Package 6 (WP6): Dissemination, to link colleagues and stakehold-
ers with the project and its findings and proposals
Currently, the project is developing Work Package 2. The second work
package of the CyberShip project has two main objectives. First, it defines a
generic cyber ship model through the identification of all systems, cyber com-
ponents, and their communication requirements in a modern commercial ship.
The resulting model defines what is understood as the "attack surface" of the
ship. As such, a ship is seen as a system composed of several sub-systems that
have individual and independent characteristics. Such a CyberShip model con-
sist therefore of all systems and cyber components in a ship, their capabilities
for computation and interaction with the environment, and the interactions
between components in a modern ship.
Second, WP2 defines a set of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) to measure
the degree of cyber resilience performance of any ship system under investiga-
tion. These KPIs are qualitative and quantitative measures of the ship system’s
resilience towards cyber attacks. These indicators come from areas such as risk
of cyber attacks, degree of resource redundancy, response and recovery times,
and implementation costs.
2 Background
The widespread adoption of Information and communication technologies (ICT)
throughout today’s ships has led researchers to focus on security and resilience
properties of a CyberShip to understand prevention, and reaction and mitiga-
tion to cyber-attacks. Focus on prevention is related to aspect such as how
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security breaches within ship’s technologies will result in variety of harmful
impacts on ship operation and its crew members. The focus on mitigation and
reaction is related with aspects such as how a system will continue to operate
with an acceptable level of performance even when a cyber-attack is occurring.
A cyber- attack is defined in the context of this project as any attempt, suc-
cessful or not, to gain illegal access to a computer or computer system for the
purpose of causing damage or harm.
Within the technologies used to process information and control processes
in a ship, Information Technologies (IT) and Operation Technologies (OT) can
be identified.
Information technology (IT) relates to:
"the entire spectrum of technologies for the information process-
ing, including software, hardware, communications technologies
and related services."
A relatively newer term is that of Operations Technology (OT), defined as:
"the hardware and software that detects or causes a change through
the direct monitoring and/or control of physical devices, processes
and events in the enterprise"
As a result of these definitions, IT and OT have different roles within the
organization: OT is related to effects in the physical world, while IT is related
to information processing. The need to differentiate between IT and OT can be
explained through differences in aspects such as
• System Availability: OT systems are required to have a uch higher real-
time availability, as these are affecting physical processes. In contrast,
IT systems have regularly scheduled periods without service, as part of
their maintenance strategy
• Dependence: while IT systems are dependent on technicians and admin-
istrators specialist in computer science, OT systems are dependent on the
final users, i.e., those who are requiring the physical services these OT
systems provide
• Access: OT has different ways in which it can be accessed, when com-
pared with the TCP/IP interface of IT systems
• Knowledge: There is a lack of understanding of the physical processes
enabled through the OT systems by IT specialists
3 Components of the cyber ship framework
The different components of the ship are shown in Fig. 1. It comprises of critical
and non critical components. Critical components are essential for the safe op-
eration of the ship. Below, we describe the critical and non critical components
of the ship.
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Figure 1: Critical and non critical components of the ship
• Engine System: It contains all the system related to power generation
and propulsion [3]. It gathers the data related to speed, rudder angle,
propeller. Moreover, it monitors the engine load, fuel consumption, wa-
ter level in the ballast compartment. Depending on the information from
the bridge control system it sends the command to propulsion control
system to increase or decrease the speed of the ship. Furthermore, it also
sends the command to increase or decrease the level of water in the bal-
last compartment depending on the information from the bridge system.
However, the use of digital systems to monitor and control on-board ma-
chinery, propulsion and steering make such systems vulnerable to cyber
attacks. The vulnerability of these systems can increase when they are
used with navigation and communications equipment on ships using in-
tegrated bridge systems.
• Automatic Identification System (AIS): The AIS device transmits and
receives data about a ship’s name, type, size, status, position, heading,
speed, cargo, next port of call as well as its IMO- and MMSI number [2].
The data is collected from the ship’s sensors.
AIS communications do not employ authentication and integrity checks.
Hackers can send specially crafted messages that could mimic the loca-
tion of an existing vessel, or even create a fake vessel and place it on its
own virtual course. It is known as AIS spoofing.
Attackers can capture and store AIS data and replay spoofed messages in
specific time frame. Moreover, attackers can modify the AIS data such as
location of position, port of call, estimated arrival time, etc. Additionally,
attackers download the data of an existing ship, changing some of the
parameters and submitting it to the AIS service. It is ship hijacking. As
there is no authentication and integrity checks so AIS system is vulner-
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able to attack traffic. Moreover, communication is made of RF. Anyone
with cheap RF receiver can also listen to these messages.
• Radar: The purpose of the radar is to detect and monitor objects through
the emission and reception of electromagnetic impulses [1]. The radar
picture continuously and automatically processed to plot the acquired
targets to determine distances and bearings towards that object. More-
over, the object’s speed, course and position can be calculated, if ship’s
own data is available. Radar devices are vulnerable to jamming and
DDoS attacks
• ECDIS: The ships which travel the oceans nowadays are obliged to be
fitted with an ECDIS [2]. All ships should maintain nautical charts for
route planning and monitoring for their voyage. ECDIS displays data
related to selectable safety contour, isolated dangers, pre-planned traffic
routes, distance to run, etc.
• GMDSS: It is an acronym for Global Maritime Distress System. Its aim
is to ensure rapid and automated alerting in case of maritime distress. It
transmits and receives the distress and safety messages through satellite
links. Transmitted messages consists of ship’s type, ship’s MMSI number.
The nature of distress message is generally related to sinking, grounding,
flooding,fire explosion etc [1].
• Echo Sounding Device: The purpose of echo sounding device is to pro-
vide information related to depth of water under ship to aid in navigation
specifically in shallow water [1]. It helps the Engine system to maintain
the appropriate level of water in the ballast control compartment.
• Cargo Management System: Computer systems used for the manage-
ment and control of cargo may interface with a variety of other system
ashore [6]. These system may include shipment tracking details available
to shippers via the Internet. Interfaces of this kind make cargo manage-
ment systems and data in cargo vulnerable to cyber attacks.
• Ballast water system: It is a compartment within a ship that holds wa-
ter, which is used as ballast to provide stability. Using water in a tank
allows for the easier adjustment of weight. It also allows for the ballast
to be pumped out to temporarily reduce the draft of the vessel when it is
required to enter shallower water. In some ships, ballast water system is
independent of the engine system. However, it relies on the model of the
ship.
• Alarm Monitoring System: It provides visual and audible signals in the
event of abnormal condition such as in fire explosion, flooding, collision,
etc. It ensures that appropriate measures should be taken quickly to mit-
igate these extreme conditions. It is also known as Integrated Alarm and
Control System [4].
• Passenger facing networks: Guest entertainment system and passen-
ger’s Internet access on the ships are public facing network [6]. If the
Internet access to the passengers are provided through the same channel
which controls the critical components on ship then t becomes easier for
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Figure 2: Impact of attack traffic on different components
the attackers to attack the control systems by attacking the guest enter-
tainment system. These systems should be considered uncontrolled and
should be segregated from the network of control system.
• Passenger service management system: It consists of the valuable pas-
senger related data such as their personal identifier, transaction details
related to bank etc [6]. Systems which is used to manage the passen-
ger related data are themselves an attack vector as the collected data is
passed on to other system.
4 Vulnerabilities and Impact of Cyber Attack on Ship
In this section, we discuss the impact of cyber attack on the different compo-
nents of the ship and how it affects other components of the ship. Specifically,
we focus on how attack on critical components can affect the normal operation
of the ship. As shown in Fig. 2 Integrated bridge system manages all the
bridge components. It provides the centralized access of the information from
all the bridge components.
As we can see in Fig. 2, if AIS system is compromised by an attacker then
it can be used to provide false information related to other ships to Integrated
bridge system. Moreover, attackers can use the compromised AIS system to
broadcast the wrong information and position of the ship itself. False infor-
mation such as next port of call or speed of the ship can cause the Integrated
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bridge system to send the control command to Engine system to divert the
ship to longer routes or increase or decrease the speed of the ship. Moreover,
false information such as position and speed of other ships can cause the colli-
sion of the ships.
Generally, AIS communications do not employ authentication and integrity
checks. Hackers can send specially crafted messages that could mimic the lo-
cation of an existing vessel, or even create a fake vessel and place it on its own
virtual course. It is known as AIS spoofing. Attackers can capture and store
AIS data and replay spoofed messages in specific time frame. Moreover, attack-
ers can modify the AIS data such as location of position, port of call, estimated
arrival time, etc. Additionally, attackers download the data of an existing ship,
changing some of the parameters and submitting it to the AIS service. It is
called ship hijacking. As there is no authentication and integrity checks so AIS
system is vulnerable to attack traffic [5].
As discussed in Section 3 that Radar provides the information about the
objects in the ship. Radar is vulnerable to jamming and DDoS attack. These
devices provide wrong information about the object because of the false echoes
caused by extraneous radar waves. These false information may cause the col-
lision of the ship with the object. Collision of ship with objects can cause delay
in offloading of cargo materials at the port and also it can sink the ship which
can cause the loss of lives and cargo.
ECDIS is used as a replacement for the paper chart for the pre planned
routing of the ship. Computer systems used for the ECDIS is vulnerable to mal-
ware attacks. Attackers can compromise these devices and replace the original
chart with their own electronic chart. As a consequence, Integrated bridge
system can issue control command to Engine system to reroute the ship to
longer or shorter route. Rerouting of the ship to a prohibited area or through
a longer route causes a delay in reaching the destination port, which can af-
fect the offloading of the cargo materials. Even, if the ship reaches early to
the destination port it can affect the offloading of the cargo materials because
of the port operation (e,g., people on port may be busy in offloading of other
materials). So, in both of the cases it will affect the supply chain management.
Moreover, it can cause the ship to stop at different port contrary to what was
planned by the crew members.
Global Maritime Distress System (GMDSS) is used to broadcast the distress
messages related to collision, flooding, sinking, fire explosion, etc. If GMDSS
is compromised by the attackers then it can be used to broadcast false dis-
tress messages to other ships or to the shore control center. Moreover, if the
engine system is compromised by the attacker then it can send the false in-
formation regarding fire explosion, flooding, sinking, collision to Integrated
bridge system which provide these alerting message to be broadcasted by
GMDSS.
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is also vulnerable to cyber at-
tacks. Signals and data of GNSS can be spoofed which in consequence can
provide the wrong position of the ship. Spoofing of data from GNSS can cause
the attack on ECDIS system as well. Since, the ECDIS system used GNSS data
to upgrades the routes and position. As a consequence,Integrated bridge
system can issue control commands to reroute the ship to other routes and it
may lead to collision.
As we have surveyed in Section 3 that Engine system comprises propul-
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sion control system, propeller, cargo control, ballast control. Engine system is
also vulnerable to cyber attacks. Specifically, the computer systems involved in
the Engine system is vulnerable to cyber attacks specially through malware.
If the Engine system is compromised by the attackers then it can be used to
send the false information related to speed, fuel consumption, engine load,
water level in ballast compartment to Integrated bridge system. This can
cause the AIS and GMDSS system to broadcast the false information related to
ship. Moreover, by hacking into the Engine system attacker can issue the con-
trol commands to divert the ship to different routes, to start or stop the main
propulsion system. Moreover, by issuing the control command to increase or
decrease the water level in Ballast control compartment attacker can also
sink the ship. It can delay the ship’s arrival at the destination port which can
affect the offloading of cargo. Moreover, attackers can also sink the ship near
the port, which can affect the operation of the port for few days which in con-
sequence affect the supply chain of shipping companies.
Moreover, cargo management system managed by the Engine system is
also vulnerable to attackers. By getting access to these systems attackers can
damage the data related to rates, loading, cargo number, date and place. Be-
cause of this no one can know where containers were, whether they had been
loaded or not. Even after the recovery of the data, it will lead to significant
disruptions in operations and resulted in sending cargo to wrong destinations
which causes severe financial loss. Generally, attackers email malware to the
port authorities or shipping companies. Then they broke into the facility hous-
ing cargo handling computers allowing wireless access to the key strokes and
screen shot of computer screen. Jammers are a common tool for cargo theft by
organized crime. Moreover, attack on cargo management system can cause the
theft of cargo and delay the supply chain management of the cargo materials to
the shipping companies. Furthermore, compromise of the cargo management
system can cause the damage to the ship. For instance, after compromising the
cargo management system hackers can close ventilation which cause the fire
explosion on the ship because of cargo material.
Apart from the attack through outside of the network, ship can also be
damaged by compromising the bridge system or engine system by rouge crew
member. For instance, rouge crew member can use the USB key to update
the ECDIS system and the USB key may contain the malware which can com-
promise not only the ECDIS system but can also affect the other components
on the ship. Even rouge crew member can bridge the segregated networks
which manages the control system (bridge and engine) on the ship with the
crew management system which can cause the attack on the bridge or engine
system.
Finally, human factors also have to be considered in a cyber-ship model, as
only in highly automated shipping systems there is no expected interaction be-
tween human operators and the shipping system. Examples of human factors
that can have a disruptive effect through cyber-attacks include evets such as
unauthorized system entry (software level) or rewiring (hardware level).
4.1 Risk Templates
Table 1 shows the vulnerabilities in the different components of the ship. It
provides the risk likelihood, planned controls which can be enforced quickly
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to reduce the impact of the attack. Moreover, we also provide the KPIs which
can be used to assess the performance of the mitigation mechanism to reduce
the impact of attack traffic.
As can be seen in the Table 1 all the components are vulnerable to the at-
tacks. Moreover, the impact of the attack traffic on the ship is very high, as it
has been discussed in Section 4 that attack on the components of the ship may
cause collision, sinking, and diversion.
Table 1 also provide the basic planned control to immediately mitigate the
impact of attack traffic on the components of the ship. For instance, if the at-
tack on the Engine system, AIS system, and Radar is detected then malicious
traffic must be should be blocked at the border router of the network to re-
duce the impact of the attack traffic. However, if the traffic is suspicious in
nature then it should be redirected to middleboxes or firewall for further pro-
cessing. Additionally, response mechanism is assess through the metrics such
as mitigation time and recovery time. ECDIS system can be protected using
strong passwords and by continuously updating the anti-virus system. If the
malicious traffic is found accessing the ECDIS system then it blocked by the
firewall right away. Ballast compartment is vulnerable as it can be used to sink
the ship by the attacker. If it is attacked then then immediate measures to re-
duce the impact is to either increase the level of the water or decrease the level
of the water depending on the threshold value defined based on the depth of
the water level depending on the position of the ship in the sea. Metrics used
to evaluate the response mechanism is mitigation time and recovery time. As
it is mentioned in the Section 3 that cargo management system contains the
details of the cargo such as name, type of the cargo and shipping details. It
is vulnerable to the attacker as it provides the financial gain to the attackers.
Basic measures to protect the cargo management system is to deploy the Intru-
sion Detection System (IDS) and firewall which continuously process the traffic
accessing the cargo management system. Metrics used to evaluate the effec-
tivenss of the mitigation mechanism are mitigation time and recovery time, i.e.
how quickly impact of the attack traffic can be mitigated.
5 Key Performance Indicators of Cyber Resiliency
A search of relevant literature revealed a series of Key Performance Indica-
tors (KPI’s) that could be applied to characterize the cyber resilience on a ship.
These indicators have been divided into behavioral, structural and financial
indicators.
5.1 Behavioral indicators
The behavioral indicators are related to the process times related to resilient be-
havior as well as indicators of the performance of the shipping system during
the resilient response. The behavioral indicators related to time, are those that
describe the dynamic response (behavior over time) of the system when react-
ing to a cyber attack. The resilient response of a system was already described
in dynamic terms by Prof. Yossi Sheffi and Prof. Jim Rice in 2005 [10], and is
represented by a "disruption curve" as can be seen in Figure 3.
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This curve represents the evolution over time for some measure of perfor-
mance in the system, such as accuracy or reliability of communication, for ex-
ample. When a cyber-attack occurs, the performance represented by this curve,
will initially decrease, up to a point where recovery will start to occur. In this
point of inflection, the decrease in the performance will stop and a gradual re-
turn towards the previous level of performance will start. The performance
level that is reached after the recovery efforts, will determine the long term
impacts of the attack. The phases in a disruption that have been identified by
Sheffi & Rice are:
1. Preparation, present in the cases where the organization can foresee and
prepare for a disruption, to minimize its effects.
2. Disruptive event, when the disruptive events actually takes place
3. First response, aimed at controlling the situation, the protection or safe-
guarding of life, and shutting down or isolating the affected systems to
prevent further damage
4. Initial impact, represents some of the immediate effects of a disruption.
In the case of cyber attacks, it may be felt as the immediate decrease in
customer service level or machine availability
5. Full impact, represents the medium to long term effects of a disruption,
such as market effects, or longer effects in the available customer service,
for example.
6. Recovery preparations, these preparations often start with the first re-
sponse or even before the disruptive event if this has been anticipated.
These may include measures of flexibility, i.e.., the redirection of exist-
ing organizational resources, or redundancy, i.e., the involvement of ad-
ditional resources such as alternate IT systems, or service suppliers, for
example
7. Recovery, Represent the process of getting the performance back to nor-
mal levels.
8. Long Term impact, representing the long term performance levels after
the recovery measures have been implemented.
These phases are represented in Figure 3.
Each of these phases can include a number of indicators related to the times
in which each of these phases is activated, for example:
• Impact time: The time it takes a cyber attack to cause a disruption in the
system it is attacking
• Detection time: The time it takes a system to identify that an intrusion
has taken place. This might be longer than the time it takes for this intru-
sion to disrupt the performance. It would be surprising if the Detection
Time is longer than the Impact time, for example.
• Total disruption time: Total time it takes an organization to return to
acceptable levels of performance, from the time of initial impact
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Figure 3: Disruption curve [10]
• Time to initial impact: Time from the Disruption time to the initial im-
pact is detected
• Time to recovery: Time from detection to the lowest point in performance
due to the disruption,
• Time to deploy redundant resources: measure of time from the detection
of the attack to the activation of additional resources. These additional re-
sources may originate both from pre-existing option contracts with exter-
nal providers of resources, from internal sources of redundancy, such as
parallel systems, or from external resources acquired and engaged only
after cyber attack has been declared
• Mitigation time: Time from the detection of the attack to the moment
whn the performance measure has returned to acceptable levels.
• Restored level of performance. The aim is to restore the performance of
the critical function to normal level after disruption caused due to attack.
Higher values are better as it means that the ship is restored to the normal
functioning level.
5.2 Structural indicators
The structural indicators are related to the parts of which CyberShip system
is composed, and how these parts relate to each other. An analysis of failure
based on structure has been proposed by Leveson in 2007 [9] and her team.
This approach considers understanding a system starting from the effects it
wants to avoid, to then work deductively towards the structures and decisions
(unsafe conditions) present in the system that currently allow it to present these
unwanted effects.
It is similar to a fault tree analysis, as it considers the definition of the sys-
tem that is under threat, the identification of a fault tree, the qualitative descrip-
tion of the tree and finally the quantitative description of the tree. However,
a systemic analysis identifies unsafe conditions in a structured way, and also
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considers unsafe conditions however indirect these may be to the causal chain
that leads to a negative effect.
In the case of a cyber-attack, the unwanted effect would be for example,
the interruption of customer service, due to the customer information system
being out of service due to some type of cyber attack. The analysis would
then proceed to identify the structure of the system, this is, the agents and
communications present in the system. Then the control actions present in the
system would be identified. These control actions are then tested for ways in
which they can lead to an unwanted effect. This analysis results in structural
recommendations that make the unwanted less likely or unfeasible.
This structured analysis begins by considering a system such as an IT sys-
tem as a series of control feedback loops, where a controller oversees a con-
trolled process though the use of sensors that pick up the state of the process
and actuators that influence the state of the process. This configuration is the
basic control feedback loop, as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Basic control loop structure
Once the components of the control structure are identified, the different
ways in which these components and their interactions can lead to an undesir-
able event, can be explored in a structured way. Examples of ways in which
these components and interactions can fail, are shown in Figure 5
The process followed by the STPA method, as applied to cyber-risks, is
shown in Figure 6.
This control loop can then be analyzed according to the types of failures
that it can contain, some of these being related to the components themselves,
but other related to the way in which these components communicate with
each other through logic flaws, for example. This leads to indicators that have
to do with the make up of the system that create the potential for failure as a
result of how the system is structured. some of these indicators include:
• Number of Unsafe Control Actions: represents the ways in which the
execution or non-execution of a Control Action designed into the system
can lead to an unwanted effect.
• Proportion of Unsafe Control Actions Per Hazard: represents the num-
ber of Unsafe Control Actions that can lead to a specific condition of risk
that given the correct environmental conditions can lead to an unwanted
effect
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Figure 5: Control structure failure examples
• Proportion of Unsafe Control Actions per Accident: represents the num-
ber of Unsafe Control Actions that can lead to an unwanted effect
Additional to this, structural measures can be derived from the analysis of
the control loops present in the existing systems, for example:
• Number of open control loops: related to the identification of desired
control structures that do not have an active control loop in the current
system structure
• Number of redundant control loops: related to the identification of de-
sired control loops that have more than one active control loop in the
current structure
Finally, structural indicators can be related to the structure of the attacks,
particularly to the characteristics of the data transfer, such as:
• Number of attempted intrusions stopped at a network perimeter: The
objective is to prevent and continue the operation of the ship. Higher
number of intrusions stopped are better. Intrusions or attacks can be on
the critical components of the ship. These attacks or intrusions can affect
the proper functioning of the ship. Higher number of intrusions stopped
are better since it signifies that the intrusions have been stopped which
allows proper functioning of the ship.
• Number of attempted intrusions deflected to a honeypot: The objective
is to prevent and continue the operation. Higher values are better.
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Figure 6: STPA process diagram
• Length of time between an initial adversary act and its detection: The
objective is to prevent the attacker from compromising the system. Lower
values are better, since if the attack is detected early then mitigation can
be performed quickly which can prevent any damage caused to the nor-
mal operation of the ship. For example, it can prevent the ship from get-
ting diverted to a longer route which can impact the arrival time of the
ship at the destination port as well as the offloading of the cargo which
can result in a delay in supply chain management of the shipping compa-
nies. This metric assumes that the initial adversary act can be identified.
• The Number of Data Bytes in Command and response Packets: De-
pending on how the components communicate the size of command and
response packets may vary. By extracting the number of bytes in com-
mand packets we can know the pattern of communication between dif-
ferent components during normal traffic connections. This pattern can be
matched continuously to monitor the state of the system.
• Inter-packet time interval: The inter-packet time interval for normal traf-
fic traffic dataset and attack dataset can be measured. From the difference
in the time interval, we can infer the that the inter-packet time interval
could be used as a classification feature to detect the attacks.
5.3 Financial indicators
The financial indicators are related to the economic effects of a disruption, be-
fore, during, after a disruption from a cyber event and for the overall disrup-
tion event.
• Cost of disruption: this indicator reflects the total monetary cost of a
disruptive event
• Cost of mitigation: this indicator reflects the monetary cost of contain-
ing the disruptive event from the time it is detected until the recovery
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operations start
• Cost of recovery: this indicator reflects the monetary cost of recovering
the performance level after a disruptive event, and from the point when
all the mitigation measures were implemented.
• Implementation costs - preventive: this indicator reflects the monetary
cost of applying measures before the disruptive event takes place
• Implementation costs - upgrade: this indicator reflects the monetary cost
of applying the upgrade measures derived from the disruptive event.
6 Future Work
This section will summarize important information needed to complete Work
Package 2 (WP2), and will detail the future work in the project that follows as
a result of completing WP2.
6.1 Pending information
As a result of the research process, number of relevant areas have been identi-
fied where information has been either incomplete or absent from the literature
that has been gathered as part of the work package.
• Management and Operation of Integrated Bridge System: Despite the
relevance of the Integrated Bridge System in the ship, as it gathers the
information provided other systems in the ship (See Figure 2), little infor-
mation was found about how this Integrated Bridge System is designed,
the format of information that is transmitted to and from the Engine Sys-
tem, which organization is in charge of its update and repair, and also
which organization is therefore expected to react in case of an emergency.
• Interaction between the Integrated Bridge System Components: De-
spite the identification of the different systems that contribute informa-
tion to the Integrated Bridge System (e.g., GNSS, Radar, AIS, ECDIS) little
information was found about how these systems interact with each other
directly.
• Interaction between the Engine System Components: Despite the iden-
tification of the different systems that constitute the Engine System (e.g.,
propeller system, ballast system, and propulsion control) little informa-
tion was found about how these systems interact with each other directly.
• Cross-interaction between System Components: Little information has
been found about the data that is accessed from across aggregated sys-
tems. For example, what information is accessed by systems such as the
GNSS or AIS from the Engine system? In the same way, which data is
accessed by the propeller or Ballast systems from the Bridge systems?
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6.2 Next steps
This work will include the insider threats as part of the CyberShip model. Ad-
ditionally, this work proposes to focus on the relationship between the Bridge
systems and the Engine Systems, according to:
• Data type enforcement: The safe and complete transmission of informa-
tion between systems is related to the standardization of these signals,
since the result of such a standardization is a more effective detection of
abnormal signals and/or patterns.
• Software Defined Networks (SDN): The use of Software Defined Net-
works as a way of automating response to attacks. Appendix 7.2 provides
an initial description of such an approach.
Finally, this approach will be included in the next Work packages that are being
developed in this project, i.e., Work Package #3 that focuses on prevention and
Work Package #4 that focuses on response and recovery from cyber attacks.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Towards SDN-based Mitigation Framework for CyberShip
The contribution of this paper is proposing a framework to mitigate the cyber attacks
against the components of the cyber ship and to trigger the proper defense actions to
countermeasure the identified attacks. We consider the following principles in the de-
sign of this framework. First of all, the design should be able to provide the defense
in an automated way and the crew members of the cyber ship should not be burdened
with such heavy tasks of implementing the security policies to mitigate the attacks to
protect the systems. Typical crew members often lack enough expertise and vigilance
to secure a network and components of the cyber ship, which often pose heterogeneous
architectures and varying degrees of security properties. To address this challenge, we
propose employing SDN technology as it provides the possibility for dynamic and au-
tomated deployment of defense mechanism.
The second design objective is that the framework should be resilient. The frame-
work should ensure that the components of the cyber ship should not be impacted too
much because of the attacks. It should be able to recover from the attack quickly to so
that the ship can operate properly and should not cause any delay.
The third objective is the efficiency of the framework. The mechanism should incur
low communication and computation overheads on the router and switches. It should
limit the volume of the network traffic that needed to be mitigated and analysed. For
instance, if the mitigation method requires rules for the traffic of a particular protocol
or a specific source or destination IP address, appropriate filters must deployed auto-
matically.
Last but not the least, the framework should consider scalability. Novel technologies
are incorporated within these emerging devices to provide a wide variety of capabili-
ties. This trends leads to a great degrees of heterogeneity in their architectures and in
turn could create different types of security exposures. To cope with this challenge, the
framework needs to support the new coming devices and technologies at a large scale.
To substantiate our claim, we propose an SDN enabled cyber ship framework. It
aims to provide defense to the cyber ship framework in an automated and dynamic
fashion. The defense mechanism is placed on the top of SDN controller, consists of key
modules: Shipboard control system, Device Manager, Mitigation module, Detection
module, Device Manager.
7.2 SDN Enabled CyberShip Framework
In this section, we propose a SDN assisted cyber ship framework. It combines the crit-
ical components of the ship with the SDN technology. It provides a cross control layer
between the critical components of the ship and between the cyber layer of the com-
munication network. Using this cross layer it is possible to integrate the the physical
and cyber countermeasures in order to provide adaptive and automated mitigation to
maintain the resilience of the cyber ship.
7.2.1 Components of the Framework
Fig. shows a framework of SDN assisted cyber ship framework. The framework con-
tains different components of the SDN technology and th ship. Firstly, we describe the
physical and data plane components of the framework and then we describe the control
plane components.
The physical and data plane components of the framework is mainly comprised of
SDN switches and the physical layer devices managing the different components of the
ship. The components are as follows:
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1. Shipboard sensors and actuators: These devices are used to control the physical
components of the ship. These devices communicate with the shipboard control
system to manage the components of the ship.
2. SDN switches: These are the programmable switches deployed in the data plane
of the framework. These switches can be controlled by the SDN controller dy-
namically through the southbound API. This dynamic control enables us to man-
age the network and improve the resilience of the framework.
Next, we describe the components in the control plane of the framework.
1. SDN controller: It is a software platform deployed in external entity able to pro-
vide the network abstractions needed to manage the network [8]. It provides
centralized intelligence and global visibility to manage the network. Southbound
API in the SDN controller enables us to deploy the rules in the switches through
a centralized location based on the need when it arises.
2. Device Manager: Our framework incorporates a database to simplify the man-
agement of a list of all known cyber physical devices. This database in general
contains: (1) an ID associated with the cyber physical device, (2) features to create
rules to redirect the traffic towards these devices, or to redirect the traffic towards
security devices such as firewalls for processing, (3) location of the devices in the
network i.e. through which switch and port the devices are connected.
3. Detection Engine: The framework employs a detection engine to examine the
network traffic to identify suspicious activities. The programmability of the SDN
technology enables the framework to deploy any detection mechanism such as
machine learning algorithm for detecting anomalous traffic. Because of the mod-
ular design of the framework, security or the network administrator have the
ability to deploy the detection algorithm according to their requirements. Once a
suspicious or malicious traffic is detected, the detection engine in the framework
identifies the attack source and the target of the attack traffic. This module then
raises a security alert and forward these information to the mitigation engine.
4. Mitigation Engine: It aims to take appropriate countermeasures to protect the
critical systems on the ship from attacks. It contains security policies defined in
high-level language to mitigate the attacks to restore the system from the impact
of the attack traffic. Based on the security alert from the detection engine security
policy in the mitigation engine is instantiated to mitigate the suspicious or mali-
cious traffic. The security policies are translated into low level OpenFlow rules
for the deployment in the switches in an automated way.
5. Shipboard control system: The framework integrates the shipboard control sys-
tem with the SDN controller. It periodically analyses the data from the shipboard
sensors to detect any faults in the physical components of the shipboard system.
In case, of faults or malfunctioning of the physical devices of the ship it sends
an alert information to mitigation engine to redirect the traffic to other physical
device or to block the traffic going towards that physical device.
7.2.2 Operational Workflow of the Framework
As shown in Figure 7, the framework integrates the SDN technology with the compo-
nent of the ship. In the Figure 7 it shown that it is integrated with the propulsion control
of the ship. The operational workflow is described as follows:
1. Propulsion control is registered with the device manager. The configuration is
provided with the device ID, switch and port information through which propul-
sion control is connected.
Page 19
CyberShip Project: Work Package 2 Report
v.180404
Figure 7: Framework of the CyberShip
2. The shipboard control system monitors the network activities on the propulsion
control or other components of the ship. It sends the command to propulsion
control system to adapt according to current status that it gather from the sensor
elements of the propulsion control. It performs the logging on network activities
associated with the critical components of the ship.
3. Detection engine collects and analyses the traffic statistics from the switch. In
case, of suspicious traffic it sends an alert information to the mitigation engine.
4. Based on the alert information from the detection engine, mitigation engine de-
ploy the low level rules in the switch to either redirect the traffic to another path
towards redundant resource. Moreover, if the traffic is malicious in nature then
mitigation engine deploy the rules in the switch to block the traffic.
7.3 Security Policy Specification:
In this section, we first describe how the high-level policies are expressed in the mitiga-
tion engine module of the framework. These high-level policies are translated into low
level OpenFlow rules for the enforcement in the switches when the need arises. The
automated policy deployment eliminates the need for manual policy enforcement.
7.3.1 Grammar of High-level Policy
1 <Pol icy >=<PolicyID ><DeviceID ><Rules >
2 <Rules >=Set ( <Rule >)
3 <Rule>=<Event><Conditions ><Action >
4 <Event>=<Attack_Type >|<Fault_Type >
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5 <Conditions >=<Condition ><Connective ><Condition >
6 <Condition >=<Field_Name><Comparison_Operator ><Value>
7 <Connective >=And|Or
8 <Comparison_Operator >= l e s s than|equal to| g r e a t e r than
9 <Action >=Block|Redirec t
Listing 1: Grammar for the High-level policy language
The high-level policy syntax provides the guidelines to the security administrators
to define the abstract policy. To do that, we need to define a grammar and formats. It
enables the network operator to express the network and security policies into an easy
to understand language without getting into low level implementation details.
In the framework, we use Event-Condition-Action (ECA) paradigm for policy spec-
ification [7]. The reasons for choosing ECA is two-fold: (1) it allows to specify a wide
variety of events which can trigger conditioned actions; (2) it enables to define an asyn-
chronous notification mechanism to react on these events. Our policy grammar shown
in Listing 1 provides the syntax to define the security and network policies in a human
readable format. The high-level policies are defined by the network operator in a simple
way through the northbound API of SDN controller.
In particular, our policy is composed of a PolicyID,DeviceID and a set of rules.
The PolicyID helps in uniquely identifying a policy in the mitigation engine module.
The DeviceID specifies the device for which policy should be enforce. Each rule is
composed of an event, some conditions and an action. Event represents what triggers
the rule. In Listing 1, we exemplify events, such as attack and fault type. However, it
is not limited to these events, other types of events can also be defined using our policy
language. A network operator only needs to specify the corresponding conditions to
define new events.
When an event is triggered, the associated parameters are checked against the con-
dition specified in the policy. Condition is generally a boolean expression which can be
evaluated to true, false or not applicable. Not applicable represents that no condition is
specified for the event. In our grammar shown in Listing 1, Condition is specified with
the field name and a value. Field name contains the name of the condition and value
represents the parameter specified for the condition.
Action specifies the high-level decision which should be enforced when the condi-
tions are met for the event. In Listing 1 two actions have been specified. High-level
action Block is enforced when it is confirmed by the Detection Engine or Shipboard
control system that traffic is malicious in nature. Redirect action is enforced when
there is suspicious activities confirmed by the Shipboard control system on Propulsion
control or by the Detection engine in the network.
7.4 Use Cases:
In this section, we demonstrates how the security policies can be deployed to mitigate
the attack in the CyberShip framework.
Blocking of the malicious traffic: When a new physical device is added in the net-
work then it is registered in Device Manager module. A table in the Device Manager
module maintains the list of physical devices with unique deviceID, device location to
divert the traffic towards the redundant resources in the network. For instance, Table 2
shows the the list of physical devices its unique ID, location of the device in the network
i.e., through which switch and port number the device is connected.
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In the use case, we assume that attack is launched by the attacker (A) on the propul-
sion control system. The
tt Detection engine detects the attack traffic. In the use case, we assume detection is
performed based on the packet threshold. However, sophisticated detection algorithm
can be deployed in the detection engine for detecting the attack traffic. Once, an attack
is detected then detection engine sends the security alert information to the
tt Mitigation engine module. Security alert information consists of attack type, flow
information, flow class, and switch ID. Type of attack includes any attack type such as
DDoS attacks, malware attack. In this case, the flow informations are:10.0.0.1,10.0.0.2,IP,
switch ID is 1 and attack type is UDP flood attack. Flow class specifies whether flow
is malicious or suspicious. Flow which is confirmed as an attack traffic is classified
under malicious class while flow which is not confirmed as whether it is malicious or
legitimate is termed as suspicious flows. In this case, flow from source IP(10.0.0.1) to
destination IP(10.0.0.2) is triggered as a malicious flow from the detection engine.
Mitigation engine then checks its policy database to enforce the action to mitigate
the attack. In the framework countermeasures policies are defined in the XML format.
An example policy is shown in Listing 2. PolicyID in the example policy specifies that
policy is defined for mitigating the attack traffic. Listing 2 shows that if attack type
is UDP flood and the flow is classified as malicious then block action should be en-
forced for the concerned flow. After getting the high-level action Block from the policy
database, Mitigation engine enforce the block action in the flow table of the switch
S1 for the flow from sourceIP (10.0.0.1) to destination IP(10.0.0.2). Mitigation engine
module also contains a python script which takes sourceIP, destinationIP, switchID, port
information, and protocol as inputs to deploy the low-level OpenFlow rules. Python
script in the Mitigation engine module is triggered based on the high-level action
which needs to be enforced.
1 <Pol i cy PolicyID=" Mit iga t ion ">
2 <Event Type = "UDP Flood Attack ">
3 </Event>
4 <Condition>
5 <flow c l a s s =" Malic ious "/>
6 %<Impact s e v e r i t y ="Low"/>
7 </Condition>
8 <Actions a c t i o n =" Block "/>
9 </Actions>
10 </Pol i cy>
Listing 2: Policy to block malicious traffic
Redirection policy to reduce the impact of attack: In addition to simply blocking
policy our framework also provide more sophisticated actions such flow redirection for
the purpose of security and in case of fault or too much load on a critical physical com-
ponent. Shipboard control system module analyzes the data from from the sensors of
the Propulsion control. Shipboard control system can use some detection method
such as based on watermark to analyze the status of propulsion control devices. If it
finds some faults or attack on the propulsion control engine then it can sends alert in-
formation to mitigation engine module. Alert information from the Shipboard control
system consists of the sourceIP, destinationIP, port, and protocol. Along with the alert
information it also sends the high-level action Redirect and the location of the redun-
dant Propulsion control to forward the traffic from the shipboard control system to
start the operation of another Propulsion control engine. Device location information
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consists of the switchID and the port information to forward the traffic. After receiv-
ing the information Mitigation engine module instantiates the python script in its
module to forward the traffic from shipboard control system to redundant Propulsion
control engine.
Another interesting application of the framework is to redirect the suspicious traf-
fic to middleboxes which are traversing to Main Propulsion control engine for pro-
cessing. A basic white-list of authorized traffic can also be created for the different
components of the ship towards the Main Propulsion control engine and redirect all
other traffic to middleboxes or firewall deployed for further inspection. A policy table
is maintained as shown in Table 3 for the traffic from the different components of the
ship to propulsion control. Policies are defined for the different components access-
ing the main propulsion control based on the context of the message forwarded by the
components to the main propulsion control. For instance as we can see in Table 3, if the
context of the message from the bridge device is to increase or decrease the speed of
the propulsion control then it is redirected to the firewall for further inspection before
being forwarded to the main or secondary propulsion control. However, if the traffic
is traversing from Shipboard control to propulsion control system the it is allowed.
Besides that traffic from other components to propulsion control with the context of the
message to increase or decrease the speed of the propulsion control is blocked.
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Table 1: Risk Template
Risks RiskLikelihood Planned Controls Impact
Action
priority
KPIs for
Assessment
Engine system High
1.Malicious traffic
should be blocked
at the
border router
2.Redirect suspicious
traffic to
middleboxes.
Very high High
Mitigation
time,
restored
level of
performance
AIS systems
(Replay attack,
communication
system)
High
1.Block the malicious
traffic
at the edge routers.
2.Redirect suspicious
traffic
to middleboxes
Very high High
Mitigation
time,
recovery
time
ECDIS High
Strong password
protection,
define access rights
for the
different hosts
Very high High
Number of
attempted
intrusions
stopped
Radar(Jamming,
DDoS attack) High
1. DDoS traffic
should be
blocked at the
edge router.
2.Suspicious traffic
should be
deflected towards
honeypot
or middleboxes.
Very high High
Mitigation
time,
Recovery time
Ballast Water
System High
1. If the water level
rises above
a defined threshold:
Close the
compartment and
decrease
the water level.
2. Increase the water level
if the water level reduces
the defined threshold.
Very high High
Mitigation
time,
recovery time
Cargo
Management
System
High
1.Traffic should be
processed
through the IDS
before accessing
the system.
2.Antivirus and
malware analysis
tools should process
the traffic
accessing the
cargo system
Very high High
Mitigation
time,
recovery time
Page 24
CyberShip Project: Work Package 2 Report
v.180404
Table 2: List of Physical Devices in Device Manager
Physical Device Device ID Device location
Attributes(SourceIP,
DestinationIP,
Protocol,Port)
Main
Propulsion Control Propulsion_1 SwitchID_1:2 10.0.0.1,10.0.0.2,IP,2
Secondary
Propulsion Control Propulsion_2 SwitchID_1:3 10.0.0.1,10.0.0.3,IP,3
Table 3: Policies specifying actions for flow from different components
Flow Context Policy Action
Bridge to Main
Propulsion Control Increase/Decrease speed Redirect Firewall
Bridge to Secondary
Propulsion Control Increase/Decrease speed Redirect Firewall
Shipboard Control
to propulsion control Increase/Decrease speed Forward
All other devices to
propulsion control Any Block
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